

# STRATEGY FOCUS

## Monetary policy and the financing of public sector deficits

**During the pandemic, developed economies put in place economic policies that were unprecedented in their scale.** The financing of such large fiscal packages depended in part on central banks helping out with asset purchase programs. This policy mix resulted in major financial transfers between economic agents, resulting in a sharp rise in government debt, a similar surge in household and corporate savings, and a new and important role for central banks in funding the government.

**Now, with the return of inflation pressures, central banks are winding down their support and governments are struggling to normalize their fiscal policy.** At first sight, it is hard to see how public debt can continue to increase at the current pace when central banks are shrinking their balance sheets. But this bean-counting approach with its assumptions that finance moves in closed loops does not tell the whole story. Other factors are at play:

- Central banks are providing less liquidity, but governments continue to create liquidity by issuing new debt. This cash continues to fuel demand for financial assets among the private sector and foreign investors.
- The bond market is also a self-regulating mechanism and has adjusted prices to reflect the changes. As interest rates have risen investors are increasing their bonds holdings into their portfolios.
- Cross-border financial balances are shifting but an influx of plentiful savings from Asia, the Gulf and Europe continues to sustain demand for financial assets, particularly bonds.


**That said, the new monetary policy of higher rates for longer undoubtedly puts greater pressure on the financing of public deficits and hence on interest rates, raising two kinds of risk:**

- **Risk of financial stress.** A slide in confidence could put pressure on the rates of certain countries' debt, as the United Kingdom found out in autumn 2022. At this stage, we see limited risk of this happening in the world's major countries. Central banks can always adjust their balance sheets to head off excessive tensions. In the euro area there is a higher risk to specific countries, such as Italy and France, where public debt ratios are projected to continue to increase rapidly. The framework provided by the single currency has however been beefed up since the 2011-12 euro debt crisis and should be able to handle any turbulence of this kind.
- **Risk of sharp budget cuts.** Countries at risk of losing investors' confidence could be tempted to radically tighten fiscal policy. Any such policy retrenchment would worsen the economic slowdown. We think this risk is particularly relevant in the euro area.


# THE COVID POLICY MIX AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (1/2)

**Massive fiscal support packages...** In 2020 the developed economies rolled out important fiscal programs to support their economies during the lockdowns. The nature of the crisis and the lessons learnt from the previous one encouraged countries to act faster and more radically than in 2008. In 2020 public sector debt leapt hence by 24 percentage points of GDP in the United States, 23 points in Japan, 22 points in the United Kingdom and 16 points in the euro area (Spain by 28 points, Italy 25, France 20 and Germany 10).

**Public debt (%GDP, IMF forecasts)**




**Public debt (%GDP, IMF forecasts)**




**... made possible by massive monetary support.** Central banks backed these fiscal packages with major policy measures of their own.

- **Policy rates cut to all-time lows.** This mainly applied to the Fed and Bank of England as rates were already negative at the ECB, SNB and BoJ.
- **Increasing balance sheets** through the asset-purchase programs that had been gradually put in place since the 2008 crisis. The technical details and nature of each program differed from region to region, but they consisted of buying up public and private debt securities (quantitative easing) and expanding existing bank financing schemes, such as the ECB's TLTRO programs. The result was that central bank balance sheets increased in 2020 by 16 percentage points of GDP in the United States, 25 in the United Kingdom, 27 in Japan and 33 in the euro zone, the steeper increase at the ECB being explained by its TLTRO program.

**Interest Rates of Main Central Banks**



**Central bank balance sheets**




# THE COVID POLICY MIX AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (2/2)

**Massive financial transfers between economic agents.** These wide-ranging economic policies inevitably meant big flows of money between economic agents, but the movements were so fast that there were no instant impacts on prices.

- **Rise in central bank holdings of government bonds.** Large asset purchases programs implied a larger holding of government debt by central banks. The Fed went from holding 13% of all sovereign issuance to 25%, the ECB from 20% to around 30% (over 37% in Germany) and the Bank of England from 20% to 31%.
- **Rise in corporate and household savings.** The fall in consumption caused by the lockdowns and the maintenance of household's incomes made possible by the economic policy mix led to a significant increase in the stock of household savings, measured by the rise in households net wealth. The government support for households in the United States was particularly generous and drove a 5% year-on-year rise in household incomes in 2020 despite the GDP contraction. Households' incomes in European economies held steady. Corporates also benefited from grants or loans which fed through to a substantial boost in their liquid assets.

### Households net worth


% of GDP



Sources: SGPB, Macrobond, Fed, BEA, ECB, Eurostat 2023 Q2

### Liquid assets of non-financial companies

% of GDP



Sources: SGPB, Macrobond, ECB, ONS, Eurostat, BEA, Fed 2023 Q4

# RECENT AND FUTURE BALANCES


## GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF CENTRAL BANKS

### Tightening of monetary policies and the start of Quantitative Tightening (QT)

Since 2022, central banks have simultaneously hiked their key interest rates and cut their balance sheets. Although they are not yet actively selling bonds (except at the Bank of England) they are applying QT by not reinvesting all or part of the proceeds when bonds mature. The BoE began in February 2022 and is currently shrinking its balance sheet by GBP 80 billion a month. This has reduced the size of its bond portfolio by over 11% so far. The Fed followed suit in June 2022 and has thus far shrunk its balance sheet from around USD 8,500 billion to USD 7,500 billion, and continues to do so at a monthly pace of USD 95 billion (USD 60 billion of T-bonds and USD 35 billion of MBSs). The ECB began to reduce its balance sheet in the summer of 2022 and has so far reduced from EUR 7,800 billion to EUR 6,000 billion, mostly through TLTRO redemptions. It is currently reducing its bond portfolio by EUR 30 billion a month.

### The decline in central bank holdings of public sector debt has been offset by other investors eager for the attractive interest rates on offer.


QT means central banks holding a lower share of government debt. This has so far been achieved without putting without significant financial pressures on the bond markets– except for the UK's crisis of autumn 2022 which had a political in origin. However, it has certainly helped push up yields across all maturities. QE happened very fast during Covid, but QT has been a much more gradual process which has allowed the bond markets to adjust supply to demand through price movements. Specifically, it has accentuated the upward drift in interest rates adding to the current appeal of sovereign bonds for investors.




The charts below show recent changes in the holders of public sector debt (left-hand chart shows amount outstanding; right-hand shows net purchases). There is a clear decline in net purchases by central banks which has so far been offset by domestic investors (households in the in both Italy and the US) or by foreign buyers. This underlines how investors sitting on substantial savings have been tempted into buying bonds by the current attractive yields on offer (as we have been recommending to our clients).

# RECENT AND FUTURE BALANCES GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF CENTRAL BANKS


**U.S Debt Holdings, Stocks**




**U.S Debt Holding, Flows**




**Germany Debt Holdings, Stocks**




**Germany Debt Holdings, Flows**




**France Debt Holdings, Stocks**




**France Debt Holdings, Flows**



**Italy Debt Holding, Stocks**



**Italy Debt Holding, Flows**




# RECENT AND FUTURE BALANCES FOREIGN INVESTOR DEMAND

**Looking beyond these adjustments, global imbalances remain and will continue to fuel demand among non-domestic investors.**

Since globalization took off in the 1990s, the world economy has seen a massive rise in current account imbalances. These financial imbalances – where a country or region’s savings fail to match its investment – are mainly being driven by trade surpluses and deficits, such as the export surpluses run by countries like China and oil-producing states. Despite successive crises, these global imbalances remain large and persistent.

An imbalance in current account transactions is not always a sign of an unhealthy economy. But “excessive” imbalances can be cause for concern, for instance if there is a danger of a sudden stop of current account deficit economies or financial bubbles caused by over-saving. As we saw with the euro zone sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and the tensions in the United Kingdom last autumn, such vulnerabilities are not restricted to emerging market economies.



Today, the pattern of global trade is changing. The United States is friend shoring its imports, looking to Latin America and Southeast Asia rather than China. This in turn has raised fears that China might start to dispose its US assets. However, China continues to post a strong trade surplus and therefore a significant excess savings that it must reinvest abroad if it wants to maintain a competitive RMB.. It is therefore continuing to invest money in different markets and remains a big investor in US bond markets.


# RECENT AND FUTURE BALANCES MORE COMPLEX BUDGET TRAJECTORIES

**Rising interest rates are making fiscal trajectories harder for some countries.**

**Government will not face financing issues in the short term in main developed economies.** The world's biggest economies have been stretching out their debt maturities which should allow them to smooth the impact of higher interest rates over time. Also, nominal GDP growth (real growth plus inflation) should continue at a fairly robust pace, albeit less strongly than in 2021-23. This means the big developed economies can count on a positive snowball effect, i.e. all else being equal and assuming public sector deficits (ex interest) are not too high, when nominal GDP grows faster than debt service costs it results in falling debt/GDP ratios.


**Heavily indebted countries are more vulnerable.** Several euro area countries - France, Italy, Spain and Belgium - are nearing the point where their public sector debt could start to snowball negatively (i.e. lock into a self-reinforcing uptrend) unless offset by significant budget surpluses (ex interest). Fiscal retrenchment has begun but is proving a very gradual process. The recent rise in interest rates could crank up the pressure further, potentially forcing them to take more drastic fiscal adjustment measures.

**General government interest rate paid**



Sources: SGPB, Macrobond, BEA, ONS 2023 Q2

**Euro area: General government interest rate paid**



Sources: SGPB, Macrobond, Eurostat 2023 Q2

# IMPORTANT INFORMATION – PLEASE READ

## GENERAL INFORMATION

This document is a marketing communication issued by Société Générale Private Banking which is the business line of the Société Générale Group operating through its headquarters within Société Générale S.A. in France and its network (departments or separate legal entities (branches or subsidiaries), hereinafter the “Entities”), located on the various below-mentioned territories, acting under the brand name "Societe Generale Private Banking" and distributors of the present document.

In accordance with MiFID as implemented in France, this publication should be treated as a marketing communication providing general investment recommendations. This document has not been prepared in accordance with regulatory provisions designed to promote the independence of investment research and Societe Generale, as an investment services provider, is not subject to any prohibition on dealing in the products mentioned herein before the dissemination of this document.

Reading this document requires skills and expertise to understand the financial markets and the economic and financial information included. If it is not the case, please contact your private banker to no longer be a recipient of this document. Otherwise, we should consider that you have all the required skills to understand the document. In case you no longer wish to receive the document, please inform by written your private banker who will take all the necessary measures.

This material has been prepared solely for informational purposes and has no contractual value.

This material does not constitute an offer of purchase, sale, or subscription in any of the asset classes presented herein, nor a solicitation of such an offer, nor is it an offer to invest in asset classes. Nothing in this document should be construed as constituting investment advice or personal recommendation to any investor or its agent. Information contained herein is not intended to provide a basis on which to make an investment decision.

Any investment may have tax consequences and Société Générale Private Banking and its Entities do not provide tax advice. The level of taxation depends on individual circumstances and tax levels and bases may change. In addition, this document is not intended to provide accounting, tax or legal advice and should not be relied upon for accounting, tax or legal purposes. Independent advice should be sought where appropriate.

The accuracy, completeness or relevance of the information provided is not guaranteed although it has been drawn from sources believed to be reliable. The information and opinions expressed in this document were produced as at the date of writing and are subject to change without notice.

This material has not been prepared regarding specific investment objectives, financial situations, or the particular needs of any specific entity or person. Investors should make their own appraisal of the risks and should seek their own financial and legal advice regarding the appropriateness of investing in any asset classes or participating in any investment strategy.

The asset classes presented herein may be subject to restrictions regarding certain persons or in certain countries under national regulations applicable to said persons or in said countries. It is the responsibility of any person in possession of this document to inform themselves and to comply with the legal and regulatory provisions of the relevant jurisdiction. This document is not intended for distribution to any person or in any jurisdiction where such distribution would be restricted or illegal. In particular, it may not be distributed in the United States, nor may it be distributed, directly or indirectly, in the United States or to any US Person.

## GENERAL RISKS

Some of the asset classes mentioned may present various risks, imply a potential loss of the entire amount invested or even an unlimited potential loss, and may therefore only be reserved for a certain category of investors, and/or only be suitable for well-informed investors who are eligible for these asset classes. In addition, these asset classes must comply with the Societe Generale Group's Code of Tax Conduct.

The price and value of investments and the income derived from them may go down as well as up. Changes in inflation, interest rates and exchange rates may adversely affect the value, price and income of investments denominated in a currency other than that of the client. Any simulations and examples contained in this document are provided for illustrative purposes only. This information is subject to change because of market fluctuations, and the information and opinions contained herein may change. Société Générale Private Banking and its Entities do not undertake to update or amend this document and will not assume any liability in this regard.

This document is for information purposes only and investors should make their investment decisions without relying on this document. Société Générale Private Banking and its Entities shall not be liable for any direct or indirect loss arising from any use of this document or its contents. Société Générale Private Banking and its Entities do not make any warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of this information or as to the profitability or performance of any asset class, country, or market.

Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. The value of an investment is not guaranteed, and the valuation of investments may fluctuate.



# IMPORTANT INFORMATION – PLEASE READ

Forecasts of future performance are based on assumptions which may not materialized. The scenarios presented are an estimate of future performance based on evidence from the past on how the value of this investment varies, and/or current market conditions and are not an exact indicator. What investors will get will vary depending on how the market performs and how long they keep the investment/product. Future performance is subject to taxation which depends on the personal situation of each investor and which may change in the future.

For a more complete definition and description of the risks, please refer to the prospectus of the product or other legal information document as the case may be (as applicable) before making any final investment decisions.

This document is confidential, intended exclusively for the person to whom it is addressed, and may not be communicated or made known to third parties (except for external advisers and provided that they themselves respect confidentiality), nor reproduced in whole or in part, without the prior written agreement of Société Générale Private Banking and its Entities.

## CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The Societe Generale Group maintains an effective administrative organization that takes all necessary measures to identify, control and manage conflicts of interest. To this end, Societe Generale Private Banking and its Entities have put in place a conflict of interest policy to prevent conflicts of interest, including information Chinese walls.

This document contains the views of SGPB teams. Société Générale trading desks may trade, or have traded, as principal on the basis of the expert(s) views and reports. In addition, SGPB teams receive compensation based, in part, on the quality and accuracy of their analysis, client feedback, revenues of their entity of the Société Générale group and competitive factors.

As a general matter, entities within the Société Générale group may make a market or act as a principal trader in securities referred to in this report and can provide banking services to the companies mentioned in that document, and to their subsidiary. Entities within the Société Générale group may from time-to-time deal in, profit from trading on, hold on a principal basis, or act as advisers or brokers or bankers in relation to securities, or derivatives thereof, or asset class(es) mentioned in this document.

Entities within the Société Générale group may be represented on the supervisory board or on the executive board of such persons, firms or entities.

Employees of the Société Générale group, or persons/entities connected to them, may from time to time have positions in or hold any of the investment products/asset class(es) mentioned in this document.

Société Générale may acquire or liquidate from time-to-time positions in the securities and/or underlying assets (including derivatives thereof) referred to herein, if any, or in any other asset, and therefore any return to prospective investor(s) may directly or indirectly be affected.

Entities within the Société Générale group are under no obligation to disclose or consider this document when advising or dealing with or on behalf of customers.

In addition, Société Générale may issue other reports that are inconsistent with and reach different conclusions from the information presented in this report and is under no obligation to ensure that such other reports are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report.

Société Générale group maintains and operates effective organisational and administrative arrangements taking all reasonable steps to identify, monitor and manage conflicts of interest. Société Générale Private Banking and its Entities have put in place a management of conflicts of interest policy designed to prevent conflicts of interest giving rise to a material risk of damage to the interests of its clients. For further information, please refer to the management of conflicts of interest's policy, which was provided.

## SPECIFIC INFORMATION PER JURISDICTION

**France** : Unless expressly stated otherwise, this document is published and distributed by Société Générale, a credit institution providing investment services authorised by and under the prudential supervision of the European Central Bank ("ECB") (located at ECB Tower, Sonnemannstraße 20, 60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany) within the Single Supervisory Mechanism and supervised by the Autorité de Contrôle Prudenciel et de Résolution (located at 4, Place de Budapest, CS 92459, 75436 Paris Cedex 09) and the Autorité des Marchés Financiers ("AMF") (located at 17 Pl. de la Bourse, 75002 Paris). Societe Generale is also registered with the ORIAS as an insurance intermediary under the number 07 022 493 orias.fr.

Societe Generale is a French public limited company with a capital of EUR 1 010 261 206,25 as of February 1st, 2023, whose registered office is located at 29 boulevard Haussmann, 75009 Paris, and whose unique identification number is 552 120 222 R.C.S. Paris. Further details are available on request or at [www.privatebanking.societegenerale.com](http://www.privatebanking.societegenerale.com)

# IMPORTANT INFORMATION – PLEASE READ

**Luxembourg:** This document is distributed in Luxembourg by Societe Generale Luxembourg, a credit institution which is authorized and regulated by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (“CSSF”) under the prudential supervision of the European Central Bank- ECB, and whose head office is located at 11, avenue Emile Reuter – L 2420 Luxembourg. Further details are available on request or can be found at <https://www.societegenerale.lu/>. No investment decision whatsoever may result from solely reading this document. Societe Generale Luxembourg accepts no responsibility for the accuracy or otherwise of information contained in this document. Societe Generale Luxembourg accepts no liability or otherwise in respect of actions taken by recipients on the basis of this document only and Societe Generale Luxembourg does not hold itself out as providing any advice, particularly in relation to investment services. The opinions, views and forecasts expressed in this document (including any attachments thereto) reflect the personal views of the author(s) and do not reflect the views of any other person or Societe Generale Luxembourg unless otherwise mentioned. Societe Generale Luxembourg has neither verified nor independently analyzed the information contained in this document. The Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier has neither verified nor independently analysed the information contained in this document.

**Monaco:** The present document is distributed in Monaco by Societe Generale Private Banking (Monaco) S.A.M., located 11 avenue de Grande Bretagne, 98000 Monaco, Principality of Monaco, governed by the ‘Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution’ and the ‘Commission de Contrôle des Activités Financières’. The financial products marketed in Monaco can be reserved for qualified investors in accordance with the Law No. 1339 of 07/09/2007 and Sovereign Ordinance No 1.285 of 10/09/2007. Further details are available upon request or on [www.privatebanking.societegenerale.com](http://www.privatebanking.societegenerale.com).

**Switzerland:** This document is an advertising according to the Financial Services Act (“FinSA”). It is distributed in Switzerland by Societe Generale Private Banking (Suisse) SA (“SGPBS”), whose head office is located rue du Rhône 8, CH-1204 Geneva. SGPBS is a bank authorized by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”). This document was prepared outside of Switzerland. Consequently, the Directives of the “Association Suisse des Banquiers” (ASB) on the independence of investment research do not apply to this document.

Nothing contained herein shall constitute, or shall be deemed to constitute, investment advice or a recommendation by SGPBS. This document does not offer an opinion or a recommendation on a specific company or security. SGPBS has neither verified nor independently analyzed the information contained in this document. SGPBS accepts no responsibility for the accuracy or otherwise of information contained in this document. The opinions, views and forecasts expressed in this document reflect the personal views of the author(s) and SGPBS accepts no liability for it. Users are advised to seek professional advice before applying any information contained in this document to their own particular circumstances.

This document does not constitute a prospectus pursuant to articles 652a and 1156 of the “Code Suisse des obligations”. The financial products, including collective investment schemes and structured products referred to in this document can only be offered in compliance with the FinSA. Further details are available on request or can be found at [www.privatebanking.societegenerale.com](http://www.privatebanking.societegenerale.com).

This document is not distributed neither by SG Kleinwort Hambros Bank Limited in the United Kingdom, nor by its branches in Jersey, Guernsey and Gibraltar together operating through the brand name “SG Kleinwort Hambros”. Consequently, the information and potential offers, activities and financial information contained in this document do not apply to these entities and may neither be authorized by these entities or adapted on these territories. Further information on the activities of the private banking entities of Société Générale located in the territories of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and Gibraltar, including additional legal and regulatory details can be found at: [www.kleinworthambros.com](http://www.kleinworthambros.com).

© Copyright Societe Generale Group 2021. All rights reserved. Any unauthorised use, duplication, redistribution or disclosure in whole or in part is prohibited without the prior consent of Societe Generale. The key symbols, Societe Generale, Societe Generale Private Banking and Kleinwort Hambros are registered trademarks of Societe Generale. All rights reserved.